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Abstract 
 
Whilst it is clear that experienced clinicians adopt a rational approach of diagnosis, the logic 
of their clinical reasoning has been difficult to define. I outline here an approach based on the 
four categories of a complete diagnosis: Anatomical diagnosis (system involved); Pathological 
diagnosis (nature of the condition); Physiological diagnosis (functional consequences) and 
Aetiological diagnosis (background cause). Each phrase of the history and examination data 
is assigned to one or other of these categories as the case unfolds, with interpretations and 
interactions allowing sub-conclusions that gradually build to a final clinical diagnosis overall. 
The system has the advantage of facilitating a diagnosis individualised to the patient, rather 
than to some previously learned diagnostic ‘check list’. As such, it should provide an advance 
over current problem based approaches to clinical diagnosis.  
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Background 
In a perceptive critique of current medical education Australian Medical Council President, 
Richard Smallwood, has thrown down the gauntlet to teachers of clinical medicine to go 
beyond merely imparting clinical diagnostic lists and skills, to explicate our ‘tacit’ knowledge of 
diagnostic reasoning.1 I agree and accept this somewhat oxymoronic challenge.  
Teaching and learning in clinical diagnostic reasoning have taken many forms over recent 
years: Hypothetico-deductive reasoning,2-4 case based studies, actual5 or simulated,3 
analogical learning,6 and problem-based learning or PBL7 to name a few. The essence of 
most of these methods is ‘pattern recognition’, with the expectation that those in learning 
should be able to diagnose any variation on the basic themes. The AMC, and others 
recognise that this in itself is insufficient.5, 7, 8  
Problem-based learning has come to dominate the field, but the stark question is this: If 
PBL is so good, why are we apparently so deficient in imparting that ‘tacit knowledge which 
directs higher order reflection and reasoning?1 And more cogently, where is all the revolution 
McMaster Medical School made half a century ago?7 Are we now indeed diminished to the 
status of mere pattern recognisers? If so, PBL may indeed be the fad some fear.9, 10 
 
The Problem with PBL 
Self-directed learning, that fellow traveller of problem-based learning, has also become 
prominent in clinical learning methodology in the last half century, with its emphasis on 
integration of pre-clinical and clinical learning. That seemed a perfectly reasonable step to 
take us beyond the previously rather rigid separation of preclinical and clinical disciplines.11 
But again, if we are now reduced to accepting ‘check lists’, then something has gone radically 
wrong. Meant to give clinical training a more basic medical science depth, this approach was 
well intentioned enough, and should have worked. Yet in practice, there were/are problems. 
In my view, two important ones are as follows. On the one hand, non-medical preclinical 
academics are rarely in a position to say which aspects of their disciplines are relevant to 
clinical diagnosis. On the other, clinicians often don’t appear to use their knowledge of the 
basic disciplines in solving diagnostic problems.12 On the contrary, we sometimes exhibit that 
knowledge in a rather post-hoc way. The extreme version of this is what Richard Smallwood 
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himself once termed ‘Touch-the-bed syndrome’ (personal communication) – i.e. ask the 
registrar for the diagnosis (say, thyrotoxicosis), touch the bed in minimal recognition of the 
patient, and then turn to the assembled entourage and hold forth with brilliance on the known 
medical science basis for the condition.   
 
Clinical Diagnosis: a personal approach 
I had to address this challenge when charged with the responsibility of teaching clinical 
diagnostic reasoning skills to medical students at the University of Tasmania. My response 
was to suggest a preclinical science framework that allows the clinical diagnosis to be 
synthesised as the history and examination findings unfold, so as to gradually ‘corner’ the 
diagnosis.13 This framework is constituted by the four traditional categories of diagnosis,14 as 
follows:  
 
1. WHERE is the problem?  ANATOMICAL DIAGNOSIS: the bodily system involved.  
2. WHAT is its nature? PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS 
3. HOW does it affect the patient? PHYSIOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS: functional consequences 
of the condition. 
4. WHY did the patient get it? AETIOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS: background cause. Subsumed 
under this category is also the question of WHO has the condition, and why it occurred 
WHEN it did. The WHO relates to the type of patient concerned, in particular to the social and 
psychological contexts of the presentation. The WHEN aims to focus on its precipitating 
factors. 
 
The history from the patient is guided by the usual features, but with a more interpretation 
of what they mean than usual, as follows:  
 
Site, radiation and quality of the symptom - relevant to ‘Where?’ the anatomical system 
involved.  
Time-intensity relationships – relevant to the general pathological nature of the condition,  
the ‘What?’ 
Aggravating and relieving factors – relevant to the type and degree of dysfunction involved, 
the ‘How?’ of diagnosis.  
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Associated symptoms – help narrow down the system involved, relevant to the ‘Where?’  
Precipitating factors – relevant to the ‘Why?’ 
Background features from the past history, family history, social history and general context of 
the presentation – all potentially relevant to the Aetiological diagnosis, the ‘Why?’  
 
On this basis, students assign each piece of the history, as it unfolds, to one or more of the 
four diagnostic categories, so making the handling of the data much easier – rather like the 
way a deck of cards is more readily assessed when sorted into its four suits. Examination 
findings are treated likewise. The method facilitates a gradual focussing down on the different 
aspects of diagnosis (Dx) without ever going too far. As the findings expand, the various 
observations and categories begin to interact and support each other, eventually building to a 
complete diagnosis overall.  
 
A brief example  
A 65 year old recently-retired male hobby gardener (Aetiol. Dx = ? environmental exposure) 
presents with a one week history (Pathol. Dx = acute process) of increasing (Pathol. Dx = 
progressive process) shortness of breath on exertion (Physiol. & Anat. Dx = ? dysfunction of 
CVS or Resp. system), to the point of being unable to walk up a single flight of stairs without 
stopping (Physiol. Dx = severe dysfunction). Associated cough (Anat. Dx = more likely Resp. 
system); productive of yellowish sputum (Pathol. Dx = prob. inflammatory process; Anat.= 
Resp. system), with occasional blood streaks (Anat. Dx = large bronchi involved/inflammed). 
Three days (Pathol. Dx = progressive process) shivers and sweats (Pathol. Dx - elevated 
temp. = confirms inflammatory process).  
So even with this limited amount of information, we can ‘rule off’ in our minds and say that 
this man, with background environmental exposure, has an acute and progressively severe 
inflammatory condition affecting the respiratory system. Not bad for just a few phrases. 
Importantly, we have begun to corner the diagnosis, and have done so without going too far. 
We are aware, for example, that some of the categories are less than complete – in particular, 
we need more information on the precise anatomical localisation of the respiratory problem 
(the ‘Where?’) as well as the patient’s background hobby (the ‘Why?’)  
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Key Aspects 
 
One key in this approach is in the ‘What?’ of diagnosis. The basis for the general pathology of 
any clinical condition is given by its time-intensity relationships. In this respect, we recognise 
conditions coming on over months/years, weeks, and days as being chronic, subacute and 
acute respectively. But importantly, any symptom coming on very suddenly (hyper-acute) can 
be regarded as being due to an obstruction or rupture of a hollow tube somewhere. If the 
symptom reverses, then it is likely due to obstruction rather than rupture.  
Another aspect is what I call category interaction. As the various categories build up, the 
information sometimes begins to interact in interesting ways. For example, in a patient 
presenting with sudden onset dysphasia and weakness in the right lower face and upper limb, 
now improving, we can say that this is a hyperacute event (the ‘What?’ of diagnosis) involving 
the left prefrontal cortex (the ‘Where?’). Moreover, it is likely due to a blockage or rupture 
somewhere within the system; and since it is improving, blockage is more likely than rupture. 
Now, if we were dealing with the abdomen, where there are many hollow tubes, this would not 
help much. But in the brain the only important hollow tubes are vascular ones. This means 
that we can now look at the anatomical diagnosis not just in neuroanatomical terms, but also 
in terms of neurovascular anatomy. From that, it is a simple step for students to realise that 
the territory involved is the left middle cerebral artery, where that we are dealing with some 
sort of vascular obstructive episode, either local thrombosis or embolic from elsewhere.  In 
this way, we have been able to sharpen the anatomical diagnosis using the pathological one.  
In implementing the method in practice, students are asked to pause whenever a symptom 
changes its time-intensity relationships, or when a new symptom appears, and draw interim 
conclusions by reflecting on all four categories and how they may have interacted so far. The 
final clinical diagnosis can then be built up hierarchically by synthesising these sub-
conclusions overall.  
The least point to be made of the method is that for a diagnosis to be complete in any 
individual, it should address all four diagnostic categories. Thus, a diagnosis of ‘Acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI)’ may be fine for textbooks, but is insufficient for individual patient 
diagnosis. Better would be something like AMI (Anat. & Pathol. Dx) with secondary left 
ventricular dysfunction (Physiol. Dx) and atrial fibrillation (Physiol. Dx: reflecting atrial 
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ischaemia), on the background (Aetiol. Dx) of the long-term CVD risk marker of hypertension, 
and the possible precipitating factor of recent psychological stress. This approach gives a 
much greater insight into each individual patient’s condition than any general names, 
acronyms, or off-the-rack labels – STEMI, TIA, IBD, Crohn’s, emphysema, etc.  
Such an approach would seem just as relevant to postgraduate as undergraduate clinical 
learning. It should also inhibit us as consultants from asking, as we sometimes do: “What’s 
your differential?’ on hearing that the patient has  ‘chest pain’, ‘splenomegaly’ etc.  
I could expound in greater detail, but for those interested, the whole system is now 
available to explore free online as a text with a series of highly interactive tutorials.15 Each 
tutorial takes the reader through the clinical information phrase by phrase, and invites 
category allocation and gradual synthesis to final diagnosis. Comparisons can be made with 
the author’s interpretations, sub-conclusions and diagnoses at any stage.  
 
Some caveats  
First, the method is meant as a guide to diagnosis rather than a rigid set of rules. 
Students/trainees are free to differ at any stage from what is essentially a work in progress, 
and indeed there is an email contact address on the website for just this purpose. Second, 
what I propose is not meant to be the only approach to clinical diagnosis. With experience, we 
all come to recognise parallels to previous cases so as to diagnose by 'pattern recognition'. 
Third, some of my critics would say that my approach still falls far short of elucidating the 
diagnostic reasoning process, and that intuition remains its most important aspect. To the 
extent that this may involve thinking ‘outside the square’ to find some model, analogy, or 
metaphor as a different way of ‘framing’ the clinical problem,16 I would wholeheartedly agree. 
But beyond that, ‘intuition’ or ‘gut feelings’ can be very unreliable and at times quite 
misleading.17, 18 In any event, I aim here to delineate such aspects of the tacit as I can, not 
those I cannot. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I also cannot say that the system has been evaluated in any formal way, but in my view it has 
served a generation of medical students well, and is now there for all to appraise for 
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themselves. It is put forward as a basis for better identifying those ‘tacit’ aspects of clinical 
diagnostic reasoning we all use but which - despite the aid of patient contexts,12 ‘illness 
scripts,’19 semantic qualifers,20 and the like12 - have proved so frustratingly difficult to 
articulate and define.12, 21  
So in the manner of Horace,22 I invite all students of medicine: “If you know anything better 
than this, openly impart it; if not, use this with me.  
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